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Abstract
This paper is a first step in trying to develop a concept incorporating population growth
and population aging concerns under one analytical umbrella. Our approach is to try to
achieve this through explicitly considering age structural changes through the analysis
of age-specific growth rates and the new measure of Cohort Succession Ratios (CSR),
which is introduced in this paper. In order to also address the issue of intergenerational
equity on both the population aging and the sustainable development concerns,
additional emphasis is put on human capital formation as measured by educational
attainment as a proxy for productivity. Since age-, sex- and education-specific analysis
can readily be carried out in a multi-state population projection context, this approach
presents a feasible and operational strategy to work towards the goal of such a more
general framework tentatively entitled “population balance.”
The paper first discusses the political need for such a more general concept, and then
works towards its operational definition through analytical and empirical considerations
and the development of a simple simulation model considering age-, cohort- and
education-specific productivity and income.
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Wolfgang Lutz and Warren Sanderson
Introduction
This paper consists of three parts that may at first sight look like three independent
contributions. But coming from different sides and using very different tools they all
work towards the common goal of trying to define a new concept tentatively labeled
population balance. The ambitious task is to develop a paradigm that can cover both
population growth and population aging concerns. In doing so it must consider both the
role of the population variable in development and environmental change, and its role
with respect to intergenerational equity. To achieve the bridging between population
growth and aging concerns, we must first transcend the conventional focus on total
growth rates and look at age-specific growth rates and other age-structural features.
Secondly, we must transcend the realm of strictly demographic variables and
endogenize into our model another individually measurable population characteristic
which probably comes close to age as a key source of population heterogeneity, namely,
level of education. The explicit consideration of human capital will allow us to link the
implications of both population growth and aging under a joint umbrella framework.
The concept of population balance is still rather tentative and needs to be much
more rigorously defined. This paper is only a first step in this direction. It is an attempt
to approach the issue
(1) First, from the perspective of political needs and priorities: Why do we need a
concept of that sort?
(2) Next, it will be approached from a measurement and empirical perspective: How can
demographers measure age-structural change? In this context the definition of a new
measure of Cohort Succession Ratios (CSRs) seems to be useful.
(3) Finally, it will be approached through a simple simulation model considering age-,
cohort- and education-specific productivity and income.
Before we go into the political dimension of this concept and later into the
analytical and empirical aspects, it is worth spending a few thoughts on the way the
words “population” and “balance” are used here. Population is used in its original
macro-level meaning describing a well-defined group of human beings with emphasis
on quantitative aspects, which are primarily total size and growth rate, but also on
changing distribution by age and sex and place of residence. There are other population-
based characteristics, such as marital status, labor force participation, ethnicity,
educational status, etc., which do not represent core demographic dimensions, but often
2enrich population analysis in a meaningful way, especially if they can unambiguously
be defined and measured as individual characteristics constituting sub-groups of the
population. To such sub-populations the demographic tools of multi-state cohort-
component analysis and projection can be readily applied. In the context of population
balance, educational attainment is considered an additional population dimension
because of its paramount importance for both the determinants and consequences of
population change. Education is not only one of the most important sources of
population heterogeneity (Lutz et al. 1999) but can also be readily measured and
projected for all parts of the world (see Lutz and Goujon 2001). Hence the population
dynamics considered in this paper comprises the population by age, sex, and educational
attainment. In other settings population balance may also include other aspects of
population, such as urban/rural place of residence or ethnicity.
The word “balance” does not have any well-defined meaning in population
studies. In economics it is sometimes used in the sense of a dynamic consistency of
certain elements of economic structure. In this context, “balance” should also have a
highly dynamic meaning, like walking on a log in the water being exposed to all kinds
of currents and winds and trying not to bend too far to either side and fall into the water.
More generally, this assumes that a “balance” is better than an “imbalance” and implies
a longer and better life for everybody concerned. “Population balance” then applies this
to all cohorts (present and future), both sexes, different social groups and different
regional (national) populations.
If, in a political sense, there is a potential model for the notion of “population
balance” then it is the notion of “sustainable development.” Although it is very poorly
defined and people interpret it in surprisingly different ways, it still has become a
politically extremely powerful notion1; the whole UN system is currently being
restructured under the notion of sustainable development. While we hope to define
“population balance” in a more precise and operational way than “sustainable
development,” it is also worth noting that the notion may benefit from not being too
narrowly defined. Different people concerned with different aspects of the issue can
read different things into it. It could mean the balance between population and the
environment; it could mean a balance in the sex and age distribution, a balance across
generations, etc. Hence, the challenge is to define the notion wide enough to make it
relevant for different groups, but at the same time to provide a choice of different
precise definitions and an analytical toolbox that allows for rigorous scientific analysis.
The International Political Dimension: Trying to Link Concerns
about Population Growth, Aging, Education and the
Relationship between Generations
International population analysis and politics is in disarray these days. There seems to
be some confusion about the role of the population variable in social and economic
development and environmental change. After decades of strong concern and concerted
action against the population explosion, recent news about the end of world population
growth to be expected during the second half of this century and fertility declines that
                                               
1
 This is not necessarily surprising, if one thinks, e.g., of how many wars the extremely vague notion of
freedom has caused.
3are more rapid than expected seem to make these concerns less relevant, even though in
individual world regions very strong growth is still to be expected. In parallel the
process leading up to the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development has
brought a strong shift of emphasis from macro-level population concerns to individual
rights and reproductive health concerns, i.e., an almost exclusive focus on the individual
welfare dimension. Macro-level population-related considerations, which also impact on
individual welfare, but in a more indirect way, were not given much attention. As an
institutional consequence, e.g., in many national development agencies, the population
offices, if they still exist at all, have become subsections of departments of health.
The population issue has largely become a specific sub-concern of health. But
there is clearly more to population than one aspect of human health, the age-structural
aspects discussed in this seminar being a good example, population-environment
interactions being another important one. In the famous “Cairo Consensus,” the Cairo
Programme of Action mentions some of these macro issues, but there is no convincing
substantive link between the main focus on reproductive health and the macro-level
consequences of fertility trends. One cannot help feeling that these macro concerns were
simply added in an unconnected fashion in order to satisfy some of the people who
“were still stuck in the population concerns of yesterday,” as some delegates put it
informally. Reproductive health and individual welfare more generally are clearly very
important aspects of population, but there is an urgent need to substantively link them to
the population related macro-level concerns.
Simultaneously, but completely unrelated to this “Cairo Concensus,” concern
about population aging grew in some of the developed countries, especially in those that
have been experiencing fertility well below replacement for several decades. This
macro-level population concern tends to concentrate mainly on the sustainability of
existing pension schemes, but also relates to expected impacts on productivity and
international competitiveness and more recently on the need to rethink immigration
policies. There is a rapidly increasing scientific literature and a rapidly increasing
international concern. Yet in international fora the aging concerns tend to be treated in a
completely unrelated way to the population growth and population-environment
concerns and the individual-level reproductive health, female empowerment and
freedom of choice concerns. There seems to be a need for some sort of an umbrella
concept that links these two macro-level population concerns to each other and relates
them to these individual-level concerns.
Another issue that gains prominence over the decades is that of intergenerational
equity. Interestingly, this concern originally arose independently from all of the above-
mentioned population discussions although it is now clearly related to the concern about
population aging. But the intergenerational dimension came to international political
prominence through environmental concerns and the very definition of sustainable
development (as given by the Brundlandt Commission). This definition is explicitly
based on intergenerational concerns, i.e., improving living conditions without
compromising the possibilities of future generations to meet their needs. More recently
in the context of pension reforms in Europe that will become necessary due to expected
population aging and the great dependence of pay-as-you-go pension systems on
relative sizes of age groups, there is increasing concern over the fact that an ever-
increasing burden of the pension load is put on the shoulders of the younger and smaller
cohorts. The degree to which the younger generations will be unduly hit by this
4depends, of course, also on the future course of productivity gains. This second factor
shall be approximated by education in this paper.
Education and human capital formation have become another important force
seen to influence both the consequences of rapid growth and rapid aging, because they
are directly related to the productivity changes associated with changes in the age
composition. Especially in the context of developing countries the World Bank has
recently announced that education would be its top priority. But future productivity
gains that are likely to be associated with higher technical skills are also seen as a
possible solution to ameliorating the consequences of population aging.  Because the
educational composition of the total population and the educational enrollment rates of
the young cohorts are not independent from age structural changes (e.g., if the youngest
cohorts grow too rapidly, enrollment rates cannot keep pace) these two things should be
viewed together. Hence both age structure and education, independently and in their
interaction, play an important role in economic growth and consequently in
intergenerational equity. The joint consideration of both may serve as a binding element
between growth and aging concerns under a concept of “population balance.”
The Dynamics of Changing Age Structures:  Analytical
Approaches and Empirical Applications
When talking about analytical approaches to describe and analyze age-distributional
changes over time, fairly simultaneous but independent work by Sam Preston (Preston
and Coale 1982; Horiuchi and Preston 1988) and Nathan Keyfitz (1987, 1990) comes to
mind. In the following we will shortly discuss their approaches and give some empirical
illustrations. We will also propose a new indicator tentatively called “cohort succession
ratio” (CSR).
Following earlier work by Ansley Coale on a generalization of the stable
population model to deal with variable growth rates, Horiuchi and Preston (1988)
published a paper in Demography entitled “Age-specific Growth Rates: The Legacy of
Past Population Dynamics.” This paper demonstrates how the widely available but
rarely used sets of age-specific growth rates in a population can be used to reconstruct
all the pertinent features of a population’s demographic history that are required to
relate major demographic functions for a particular period to one another. They derive a
formula,
, ) ,(   ) ,(
) ,(
 ln
0
dxtxr
tan
taN a∫−=
which implies that the current age distribution N(a, t) can be obtained by deriving the
underlying stationary distribution n(a, t) and converting it into the actual distribution by
using age-specific growth rates, r(x, t), at age x and time t.
The density function of the stationary population is derived from current births
and mortality schedules as given by
n(a, t) = B(t)p(a, t),
where n(a, t) is the size that the cohort aged a at time t would attain if the cohort had the
size B(t) at birth and had mortality experiences as observed at time t.
5This concept has been used mainly to make estimates from incomplete data. But
age-specific growth rates also provide useful information about the history of a
population for periods during which vital rates were not recorded. Whether and how this
approach can be used in addressing future population-related challenges needs further
exploration.
Nathan Keyfitz’s work on the issue essentially grew out of his empirical work in
advising the Indonesian government on population-related challenges and the analysis
of past and likely future world population trends. It may be best known under the
keyword “international youth cohort” (Keyfitz 1990). This work focused both on the
reconstruction of the onset of the post WWII population growth and on the possible
consequences of age-structural discontinuities. In his 1987 paper entitled “The
Demographic Discontinuity of the 1940s” he reconstructs the onset of the “population
explosion” through the analysis of intercohort increases as given in more recent
censuses. As an analytical tool Keyfitz mainly uses difference analysis (Keyfitz 1990).
By describing the first and second differences between the sizes of subsequent cohorts
in an often graphical manner, the demographic discontinuities become readily visible.
Although much of Keyfitz’s work in this field is being used for the same
purpose as that of Preston and others described above, namely the reconstruction and
decomposition of past trends, Keyitz also extended his work into the future and makes
projections of likely future discontinuities as embedded in the pattern of cohorts already
born. Occasionally, he drew inferences beyond the limits of demography by, e.g.,
suggesting that during the mid-1990s Indonesia may see some major political shake up
due to the numerous rather well-educated youth cohort entering the labor market
(Keyfitz 1988). This bold forecast turned out to be quite accurate.
In studying intercohort changes, whether it is done through age-specific growth
rates or differences between cohort sizes, both Preston and Keyfitz limit their focus to
the comparison of adjacent cohorts. In the broader context of studying the implications
of population aging and issues of intergenerational equity, it is useful to apply a more
general scheme that generally describes the relationship between any two cohorts at a
given time. To do this we introduce the notion of cohort succession ratios.
A cohort succession ratio can be defined as follows,
CSR (a,x,t) = N (a,t) / N (a+x,t)
with N standing for total population (of both sexes) and the indices a for age (indicating
either single or five-year age groups), t for time, and x for the age difference in years for
the cohorts to be compared.
In the case of x = 1 (or 5 in the case of five-year age groups) the pattern of CSRs
should be very similar to that of age-specific growth rates and first difference because
all compare adjacent cohorts with only the metric being different.
Figures 1a–e give empirical illustrations of the patterns of the different measures
discussed over age and time for China. The data are five-year age groups from 1950 to
2050 as given by the UN (1999) estimates and projections. Figure 1a simply gives a 3-D
plot of the total population of China (without Hongkong) for men and women
combined. It shows that in 1950 China had a very young age distribution with some
scars of history. Up to the 1970s the population at all age groups (interrupted by the
turmoil of the 1960s) grew sharply with the movement along cohort lines clearly visible
6as ridges on the graph. Mortality improvements are shown by the fact that the ridges
become more horizontal over time, i.e., there is less attrition of cohorts over time. After
that low fertility results in declining initial sizes of birth cohorts with strong echo effects
from the adult age distribution.
The first differences (calculated as the differences in size between the same five-
year age groups in year t+5 minus that in year t) are plotted in Figure 1b. They give an
even more pronounced picture of the consequences of the fertility trends and the
associated echo effects on the starting sizes of cohorts. After the period of high fertility
in the 1950s, there was a short but steep cut around 1960 associated with the great leap
formward (which with some imagination is also seen in terms of higher mortality
through a different inclination of the ridge). After recovery of fertility, another steep
decline followed during the late 1960s. Finally, during the 1970s the consequences of
the strict one child per family law became evident. The picture is somewhat distorted
due to the fact that it only looks at the trends of five-year age groups. The data base
probably includes a lot of estimated and smoothed data, especially for the older cohorts.
The graph of second differences (Figure 1c) shows the same pattern in an even more
pronounced fashion.
Figures 1d and 1e give the age-specific growth rates and the cohort succession
ratios for subsequent cohorts. As expected these two indicators show rather similar
patterns. Since these measures operate on a relative scale and are more sensitive to data
problems, especially in the older age groups with few members, these graphs are
restricted to the population below age 50. One thing is very clear from the comparison
of all these figures. The strong fluctuations in Chinese fertility during the past decades
are likely to produce strong waves of echoes, even in the case of almost constant future
fertility as assumed by the UN.
One strength of the CSRs, as compared to the other measures, is the possibility
of comparing non-adjacent cohorts. Figures 2 to 4 present such indicators for China,
Thailand and Singapore. One ratio compares the youngest cohort (age 0-4) to the cohort
aged 25-29. Since this 25-year difference is close to the mean age of childbearing, the
ratios can be roughly interpreted in the sense of a gross reproduction rate that to some
degree adjusts for infant and child mortality, or a net reproduction rate not considering
the mortality of ages 5-24. Before 1970 this ratio tends to be above two in all three
countries, indicating that the size of the youngest age group was more than twice that of
the age group 25-29. In all three countries fertility decline brings down the ratio
thereafter. In Singapore, a level below 1.0 has already been reached in 1980. Singapore
is special in the sense that immigration of young adults has a great influence on these
ratios.
The other ratio plotted in Figures 2 to 4 is of those aged 20-24 (a typical age for
entering the formal labor market) and those aged 60-64 (a typical age for retiring, at
least in industrialized countries). Hence, as a rough approximation this ratio could
possibly describe labor force replacement (those entering divided by those leaving). If
this ratio is above 1.0, the labor force is growing. In all three countries we see a very
strong growth in the labor force between 1950 and the present. As to the future,
Singapore will first reach a situation in which the labor force replacement will fall
below 1.0. In Thailand and China, this is only likely to happen after 2020.
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We have to do more to move this analysis toward incorporating the aspect of
human capital formation. This is important for answering the question whether, e.g., a
labor force replacement ratio below 1.0 is something to be concerned about. Since
educational attainment of the labor force is a most important determinant of future
productivity and hence impacts on the future standard of living and intergenerational
equity, we will have to find a way to include it into these calculations.
Table 1 gives some very simple calculations based on the recently produced
projections of educational attainment for 13 world regions (Lutz and Goujon 2001).
These first global forecasts of the population by educational attainment distinguish
between four educational groups: no education, some primary, some secondary and
some tertiary. For the purpose of simple calculation, we combine them into two groups
and simply assume that those aged 20-65 with no or some primary education have a
productivity of 1.0, and those aged 20-65 with some secondary or higher education have
a productivity of 2.0. Those below age 20 and above age 65 are assumed to be not
productive in this model. Table 1 presents a ratio calculated in the following way: The
number of working age (20-65) men and women with higher education is multiplied by
the factor of 2.0 and added to the working age population with lower education. This
sum is then divided by the total population (all ages) in the given year. This ratio can be
interpreted as a measure of the age- and education-dependent productivity of given
populations.
Table 1. Change in age- and education-dependent productivity for selected world
regions. Men and women aged 20-65 with no and some primary education have a
productivity of 1.0; those with secondary and tertiary education, 2.0. Based on IIASA’s
educational projections (in millions).
Region 2000 2030
(1) (2) (3) (4)* (1) (2) (3) (4)*
Low
ed
High ed Pop Ratio Low
ed
High ed Pop Ratio
South Asia 498 191 1367 0.64 731 492 2030 0.84
China Region 449 391 1408 0.87 274 749 1617 1.10
Pacific Asia 169 94 476 0.75 179 218 605 1.02
Western
Europe
75 201 456 1.05 25 247 480 1.08
North
America
9 177 314 1.16 15 199 390 1.06
* (4) = [(1) + 2 x (2)]/(3)
12
Table 1 presents these calculations for five selected world regions. South Asia
has the lowest ratio in 2000 and is likely to have the lowest one in 2030, despite some
improvements. The main reason for this poor performance is the low educational level
of the total population combined with still high youth dependency. The China region,
which has a comparable total population size in 2000, has much better starting
conditions in 2000 (even better than South Asia will have in 2030) due to strong past
investments in education and lower fertility. By 2030 China is likely to reach a high
level of 1.10 which, according to our specifications, will be higher than the age and
education-dependent productivity ratios for Western Europe and North America (of
course, these measures do not give special attention to highly-advanced technological
skills). But these trends clearly indicate that China will strongly gain in terms of
international competitiveness. The region of Pacific Asia, which includes most of
Southeast Asia, is also set for an impressive improvement. While being between China
and South Asia in 2000, it is likely to have even more impressive gains in age-and
education-dependent productivity than China.
But even this weighting by education does not yet bring us to a full
operationalization of intergenerational equity concerns in the context of “population
balance.” To make further progress in this direction, for the time being we will leave the
realm of empirical data and enter the world of simulation.
A First Attempt to Simulate Age, Cohort and Human Capital
Aspects of “Population Balance”
Population balance can mean many things. For example, it could mean population in
balance with its environment. It could mean a balance of sex or age groups. It could
mean a population whose growth is in balance with the growth of the capital stock and
infrastructure that it needs for its production. But it would be difficult to understand
“population balance” if we were to integrate them all into a single very complex
framework. Instead, we go to the other extreme of producing a simple model of
population in balance between its period aspect (production) and its cohort aspect
(lifetime consumption). By studying first this aspect of population balance and later
adding other elements to it, we hope eventually to produce a rich understanding of
“population balance.”
Population in balance with its environment is commonly discussed under the
rubric of “sustainable development.” In that context, the definition of balance is clear.
Generations that come first are not to consume and produce in such a way that future
generations are denied the possibilities that the earlier generations possessed. More
briefly, balance is intergenerational equity. Because of the importance of
intergenerational equity itself and because we anticipate soon adding environmental
balance to our framework, we interpret balance here to mean intergenerational equity.
We assume a one-sex population closed to migration and with fixed age-specific
mortality rates. There are two types of people: those with education and those without
education. Two things are allowed to vary exogenously over time: age-specific fertility
rates, summarized by the total fertility rate (TFR), and probability of a young person
becoming educated.
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The life cycle is assumed to have three stages. In the first, children consume,
either acquire education or not, but do not produce. In the second, adults consume and
produce both children and output. In the third, retirees consume, but again do not
produce output. Output in any year depends on the numbers of educated and uneducated
people in the second stage weighted by their relative productivities.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )eetNuutNtY pipi ⋅+⋅= ),,2(,,2 , (1)
where ( )utN ,,2  is the number of uneducated people in life cycle stage 2 in year t, ( )upi
is the productivity of unskilled workers, and ),,2( etN  and ( )epi  have the analogous
interpretations for educated workers.
People aged 6 and above in stage 1 can obtain one year of education every year.
Once enrolled in education at age 6, they remain in school or other training to the end of
the stage. The enrollment rate at age 6 changes exogenously over time. Each year of
education is assumed to cost E euros per year. The total cost of education in year t is
simply the product of the education cost and the number of children in school.
( ) EetNtEDCOST ⋅= ),,1( (2)
where ),,1( etN  is the number of people in stage 1 who are in school and E is the per
annum cost of schooling.
Output is divided among the people alive at time t. People in stage 1 get to
consume a fraction, w(1) of the amount allocated to people in stage 2. People in stage 3
get to consume a fraction w(3) of the amount allocated to people in stage 2. The two
fractions are considered exogenous here.
The income of a person in stage 2 in year t, then, is just I(2,t), where
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )etNutNwetNutNetNutNw
tEDCOSTtY
tI
,,3,,33,,2,,2,,1,,11
,2
+⋅++++⋅
−
= . (3a)
The income of a person in stage 1 in year t is
( ) ( ) ( )tIwtI ,21,1 ⋅= , and            (3b)
( ) ( ) ( ).,23,3 tIwtI ⋅=             (3c)
The lifetime average income of a person born in year c who survives to his/her
100th birthday is:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 100
1
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a
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Before we look at simulation results from this very simple model, it is perhaps
important to strongly emphasize that we do not interpret this to be a realistic model of
population and production. To take the model in the direction of greater realism, we
would have to incorporate factors such as the capital stock so that we could capture the
capital dilution effect of faster economic growth, the environment, so that we could
capture diminishing returns generated by fixed resources, endogenous technological
change, so that we could incorporate the effects of scale and education on the rates of
invention and adoption of new technologies. All of these would greatly complicate the
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model and distract us from the main point that we wish to make here. In the simplest
imaginable age-structured model of population, which takes into account both its period
aspect (production) and its cohort aspect (lifetime consumption), balance is best.
This model differs from standard economic models by having no discount rates.
The logic of balance in the sense of sustainable development requires that all cohorts be
treated equally; this rules out discounting across cohorts. Discounting within cohorts is
a different matter. Instead of Eq. (4), we could have chosen to look at expected lifetime
income, where the expectation was taken over the probabilities of surviving to different
ages. Given that we used a life expectancy of birth of 70 years and that it does not vary
over the simulations, the results would not have been much different. We have tried
here to be as simple and transparent as possible and did not want to introduce any
unnecessary complications.
Figures 5 through 9 show simulations of the simple model under the following
assumptions:
1. Stage 1 lasts from age 0 through age 19. Education and training lasts from age 6
through age 19. Stage 2 lasts from age 20 through age 64, and stage 3 lasts from age
65 through 99.
2. Simulations were run for 200 years, resulting in complete lifetime observations on
100 cohorts.
3. All simulations are begun from stable population age distributions.
4. u)= 100 and H 200.
5. E=100.
6. w(1)=0.4 and w(3)=0.9.
7. Age-specific mortality rates are taken from the Coale-Demeny model, West life
table for females with life expectancy at birth equal to 70.
8. The pattern of age-specific fertility rates is that given by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census for Argentina in 2000.
Preliminary sensitivity tests shows that the results concerning population balance
that we see below are robust to plausible changes in these assumptions.
Figure 5 shows the lifetime incomes of stable populations for three levels of
proportion educated for total fertility rates ranging from 0.01 to 6.0. Given the mortality
rates that were used, replacement fertility occurs at a total fertility rate of 2.13.2 The first
thing to notice about this graph is that lifetime income in stable populations has a single
interior peak in the range of relevant total fertility rates. Total fertility rates, and
therefore population growth rates, that are too high lead to lower average lifetime
incomes. Total fertility rates that are too low, and therefore lead to rapid population
shrinkage, also cause lower average lifetime incomes.
The shapes of the curves in Figure 5 are the result of two opposing forces. With the
mortality rates used here, higher total fertility rates cause the fraction of the stable
                                               
2
 For ease of comprehension, total fertility rates are transformed into their usual metric for a two-sex
population.
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population in stage 2 to decline. This, along with the increase in the population in stage
1, causes the numerator of Eq. (3a) to decrease. This is offset to some extent by the age
structure effects at stages 1 and 3. According to our assumptions, the population in stage
1 has a lower command over income than the population in stage 3. Higher total fertility
rates, therefore, also cause the denominator of Eq. (3a) to decrease.
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Figure 5
Figure 5 also shows that the peak level of lifetime income occurs at lower total
fertility rates for more educated than for less educated populations. This happens
because educating children is a costly process that must occur prior to recouping its
benefits. Age structures with lower proportions in stage 1 are therefore somewhat more
advantageous.
In Figure 6 we have plotted average lifetime incomes in stable populations for
three levels of fertility and for proportions educated between zero and one. Regardless
of the level of education, lifetime income is always higher when the total fertility rate is
at replacement than when it is either 1.0 or 3.0. This is just another way of seeing the
advantage of population balance.
In Figure 7 we can see the effects of an education transition on the lifetime
income of people in three different stable populations. The figure shows the average
lifetime incomes of the 100 cohorts for which we have a complete 100 years of
observation (i.e., simulation).3 The education transition begins in year 100, when 85
percent of the children at age 6 enter school instead of the earlier 15 percent. The three
                                               
3
 Cohort 1 lives from year 1 through year 100; cohort 2 lives from year 2 to year 101, and so on.
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cases are again a stationary population associated with replacement level fertility, a
growing population with a TFR of 3.0 and a shrinking population with a TFR of 1.0.
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COHORT INCOME: EDUCATION TRANSITION IN YEAR 100 FROM 15% TO 85%
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The curves in Figure 7 fall and then rise. They fall because people in the early
cohorts pay for part of the increased schooling costs when they are elderly and do not
live long enough to enjoy any of the increased productivity of the educated children. It
rises because eventually the increased productivity of the educated dominates the earlier
educational investment costs. Again, we see that balance is best. Lifetime incomes are
always higher in the population with replacement level fertility.
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Figure 8 is like Figure 7 except that here we look at the effects of a fertility
transition from a TFR of 4.0 to a TFR of 2.0 occurring in year 100 in the context of
three different levels of education. As we would expect from what we have seen before,
these fertility transitions increase average lifetime income at each level of education.
THE EFFECT OF A FERTILITY TRANSTION FROM A TFR OF 4 TO 2 IN YEAR 
100 ON COHORT LIFETIME INCOME
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THE EFFECTS OF STAGGERED FERTILITY AND EDUCATION TRANSITIONS ON 
COHORT INCOME
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Figure 9 combines the situations of Figures 7 and 8 and looks at the joint fertility
and education transitions. All simulations between with the stable age distribution are
associated with a TFR of 4.0. We consider three cases. In one the education transition
(an increase in the percent educated from 15 percent to 85 percent) precedes the fertility
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decrease (a decrease in the TFR from 4.0 to 2.0). The education transition begins in year
75 and the fertility transition begins 25 years later. In the second case, the timing is
reversed and the fertility transition begins in year 75 and the education transition
follows 25 years later. In the third case, the transitions are concurrent, both beginning in
year 88.
In the case where the education transition leads the fertility transition, lifetime
income of the earlier cohorts is suppressed, and lifetime income of the later cohorts is
enhanced relative to the situation where the timing is reversed. If we were to consider
more cohorts, however, eventually the three lines would coincide as the stable age
structures become identical. We could have produced the analogs of Figures 8 and 9 for
transitions from a TFR of 2.0 to a TFR of 1.0. Regardless of the timing of the
transitions, lifetime incomes would fall.
We have shown that population balance appears in the simplest possible age-
structured model of consumption and production. The problems of rapid population
growth and rapid population shrinkage are indeed two sides of the same coin.
Outlook
This paper has presented a first and rather scattered attempt in defining a new concept
tentatively called “population balance.” It first discusses the desirability of such a
concept bridging the population growth and population aging concerns by giving
explicit consideration to the implications of age-structural changes and by endogenizing
human capital formation. In this paper the key criterium of sustainability, namely
intergenerational equity, is being discussed and simulated in the context of comparing
lifetime income across cohorts. A next step will be to expand the model to explicitly
incorporate environmental constraints and feedbacks.
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